Our model presents analytical results and sensitivity analyses – using a simulation exercise – of various parameters to study the maximum size of stable coalitions and the resulting cooperation gains. Our modelling decisions were determined by the need for a broader understanding of coalition stability factors and the impact of certain features of the biodiversity dossier on the scope of effective agreements. Another desirable contribution to the model would be to improve its empirical relevance by integrating real data into the theoretical framework of the model, as others have done before (Winands et al. 2013). Setting up the model to conduct a digital exercise using empirical data would provide a better understanding of the policy implications of coalition building in the context of biodiversity. An example of a British Columbia country is Indonesia. According to the GEF Biodiversity Benefits Index (World Bank 2008), Indonesia`s relative biodiversity potential is very high; However, conservation activities are relatively costly for the government. Indonesia is one of the richest countries in terms of biodiversity. However, the opportunity cost of conservation is very high, as the industry in this country is growing rapidly and putting pressure on its nature. Category Bc reflects countries like Australia. This country also has relatively high benefits from preserving biodiversity.
Nevertheless, the opportunity cost of conservation in Australia is relatively low. An example of a British Columbia country is Mali, where biodiversity potential is low in terms of species represented and habitat diversity, but the costs of conservation activities are high. Finally, category bc reflects countries such as Finland, where biodiversity levels and the cost of biodiversity conservation are relatively low. The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Equitable and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity was adopted on 29 October 2010 in Nagoya, Aichi Prefecture, Japan, at the tenth session of the Conference of the Parties[17] and entered into force on 12 October 2014. [18] The Protocol is a supplementary agreement to the Convention on Biological Diversity and provides a transparent legal framework for the effective implementation of one of the three biodiversity objectives: the equitable and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources. It thus contributes to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. [17] [19] As mentioned in the introduction, we use a species count as an approximate measure of biodiversity, as there is usually no more detailed information available to record distances (taxonomic or otherwise) between species. Based on a species count, we define in our model the biodiversity endowment of a country as the number of species originally existing, characterized by (bar{q}).
This allocation sets an upper limit on retention which is supposed to be the same for all countries (but we will relax this assumption later). We also define the conservation level of a country (i en N), identified by q i , as the number of species conserved in the country. We use hyperbolic cost functions (instead of quadratic cost functions) that reflect that the marginal cost of conservation increases monotonically and indefinitely as a country approaches its maximum possible conservation level, (bar{q}). All these agreements contribute to the implementation of the Global Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and efforts to achieve the 2020 Biodiversity Targets (20 Aichi Targets). These were adopted in October 2010 in Nagoya (Aichi Prefecture) for the concrete implementation of the CBD. Different characteristics distinguish the case of biodiversity protection from the conventional model of emission reduction. First, biodiversity is unevenly distributed across countries. Each country has a different biodiversity endowment that is limited, and therefore the impact of conservation efforts within a country is limited. Second, the benefits of conservation are perceived differently at different scales (from local to global). Third, conservation efforts should not be aggregated additively, as is typically the case with emission reduction efforts in coalition-based climate change models.
Two areas of the same size can be very different in terms of biodiversity richness (e.B. measured by a species count). Therefore, they should not be evaluated immediately. To measure biodiversity conservation, counting species in each country can lead to double counting of species in a global assessment. In addition, in some cases, spatial aspects such as habitat connectivity and the minimum size of the protected area are considered requirements for species conservation, which means that the location of biodiversity plays an important role in the conservation game. Finally, the term “biodiversity” includes the inherent characteristics of public, associative and private goods (Kaul, 1999; Kumar 2010; Salles, 2011). This combination of characteristics is a challenge for effective and sustainable management of biodiversity. With Biden now in power, some experts see a path to ratification — certainly environmental groups are calling for that — while others say there`s no chance of courting enough Republicans.
But everyone agrees on one thing: the absence of the United States in the agreement is hurting biodiversity conservation at a time when such efforts are urgently needed. The management of the world`s environmental resources is a difficult task, as binding international rules must be agreed but implemented at the national level. A wide range of international environmental agreements (IAAs) have been negotiated to address certain environmental concerns. .
